“The only place where an Arab can hit a Jew and get a medal for that”
Israeli Arab boys warm up prior to a fight. Arab village of Arabe, northern Israel. June 29, 2012. Credit: Associated Press.
October 27, 2017
In 1963 Hamze Yunes was a rising boxing star and represented his Israeli sports association, Beitar, in international competitions. Eight years later, in 1971, he was captured in the Mediterranean Sea while commanding a group of Palestinian naval guerillas on their way to kidnap Israeli soldiers. In 1974, he became a Palestinian national hero after an escape from an Israeli jail to Lebanon. Hamze’s life story, from Israeli boxing star to Palestinian guerrilla, is not only material for a Hollywood action film, it is also a compelling case study that illustrates how the relationship between sports and politics depends on personal biographies and the social location of the actors involved.
The integrative orientation of Arab boxing in Israel
Arab athletes in Israel, and boxers in particular, have rarely taken part in political protests like the recent kneeling protests of NFL players in the United States. This “a-political” character has deep historical roots. Under the Military Government1 (1948-1966), Israeli authorities cautiously encouraged muscular empowerment of Arab youth as long as it was considered a distraction from subversive political activity. At the same time, the combative nature of some sports made them a subject of close surveillance. Under these circumstances, the only way for Arab boxing to survive was by obfuscating any nationalist connotation.
Starting in the 1980’s, Arabs gained complete domination in boxing in terms of participation, achievements, and representation in administrative positions. In the 2005 championships, for example, among the 460 participants, 234 (more than 50%) came from clubs representing Arab towns, and 75 (16%) came from clubs representing mixed towns and cities. Following the arrival of large numbers of Jews from the former Soviet Union, which started in 1989, some of these more recent immigrants became boxing champions, but without really threatening Arab domination of the sport. Between the years 2001 and 2004, 40 out of 52 (77%) championship titles for male seniors were won by Arab boxers. This is remarkable considering that Arabs make up only 17% of Israeli citizens.
An intriguing aspect of this overrepresentation of Arabs in such a high-contact, combative sport is that it has rarely translated into explicit expressions of political protest or ethno-national confrontations. Samir Arafat, an international boxing referee and a former member of the boxing association board, provided a blatant expression of the tendency to avoid any Palestinian nationalist connotation. His last name is identical to that of the late Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat. In boxing competitions, however, Samir Arafat usually asks the announcer to use his first name only. His son Fares, a boxer who was in the Israeli cadet squad, also insisted in press interviews on distancing himself from any association with Yasser Arafat.
In a 2003 interview with the Hebrew daily Haaretz, Ghanem Mahrum, the coach of Golden Gloves Nazareth, the most successful Arab boxing club in Israel, joked that, “The only place where an Arab can hit a Jew and get a medal for that is Israel’s boxing championship”. To what extent does this joke reflect the quietist tendencies of most Arab-Israeli boxers?
The intimidation, humiliation, and routine indignities that Arabs endured under the Military Government in Israel are well documented, and there is also robust evidence for boxing’s popularity among Arab men in Israel at that time. Yet, we rarely find an articulated narrative that links these two phenomena. This is exactly what makes the story of Hamze Yunes, and his memoirs, published in 1999, so important.
Becoming a boxer
Hamze Yunes was born in 1944 in ‘Ara, a small Arab village annexed to Israel following the ceasefire agreement in 1949 between Israel and Jordan. As a five-year-old child, he witnessed the entrance of the Israeli forces into his village. From his adolescent years, he had strong memories of fear and humiliation. In his memoirs, he explained how these feelings propelled him to be a boxer:
“Suddenly the withdrawal [of the Arab forces] happened and the strangers went in without fighting, and started humiliating the people. They built near the mosque of ‘Ara a big arc and hung on it a foreign flag and ordered the village’s men to stand in line and to pass underneath the arc. Some youngsters and men were able to hide, escaping from the surrender passing. But those who escaped did not dare to boast, [and did so] only quietly and without full confidence.
The Border Police Troops, who are more evil than the army, conducted campaigns of search, looting, and destruction, after they gathered the men of the village and ordered them to sit on the ground. Because of what I saw and heard about the actions of the Border Police I felt, for the first time, fear. How do the men sit on the ground? And how do they allow strangers to invade their homes? I understood that the metal pipes [i.e. the guns], not those who carry them, are the reason for the surrender that made feel the fear. These feelings disturbed me very much, so I begun to think about learning how to defend myself."
Notably, the first foreshadowing of his boxing career is introduced by his description of the men of the village being forced to walk under Israeli flag in a literal rite de passage of surrender and to sit on the ground, unable to resist. For Hamze, boxing became an important sphere for rehabilitating an undermined image of masculinity; his participation in the sport was an act of self-strengthening and not just a means for self-defense.
In middle school, Hamze studied in Ha-ma’apil, a Jewish kibbutz; in his memoirs, Hamze insists on mentioning that the kibbutz was built on the ruins of the village of Kakun, emptied and destroyed in the 1948 war. His reference to this period in his life shows us that Hamze, like other young men of his generation, tried to find his place among his Jewish peers but felt rejected. He writes about some friends he found among the Jewish students, although he always felt that they were somewhat reserved and even racist in their treatment of the Arab students. But one incident received special attention in his memoirs.
At the age of 16, the Jewish students left for several days for para-military youth exercises (known as gadna). This is a regular occurrence aimed at preparing Jewish youth for their military service two years later. When his schoolmates came back and were sitting with the Arab students, they talked about practicing shooting a gun, and these stories caused tension between the Jewish and Arab students. Now, not only did Hamze face the helplessness of being subjected to military rule, he also had a frustrating point of reference and comparison – the Jewish male youth who had the opportunity to hold a gun and perform their masculinity as warriors. Hamze continues:
"Anyway, the kibbutz members were covering their discrimination with a cover of rationality, and did not treat us as it was common in the Jewish street. For example, if an Arab argued with a Jew, immediately the latter would shout: ‘an Arab, an Arab’. These words were like a call and a sign to other Jews that an unwanted person is among them and immediately some Jews gathered from everywhere to add kicking and beating. If they heard this call they would compete with one another in capturing the prey. Then, if an Arab’s blood spilled on them, they would say to the police that the Arab should be blamed because he soiled the Jew’s clothes!
This reality forced me to learn boxing to defend myself, and to avoid being an easy prey to fanatical aggressions. Quickly I was successful in boxing and after one year of continuous practicing I won the state’s championship for youth. After one more year I became the best boxer and in 1963, I won the state championship in the Light Middleweight category."
Here, Hamze gets closer to justifying his boxing career in the need for self defense. It is important to remember, however, that Arab-Jewish fist fights of this kind were not a daily phenomenon. At the end of the day, Jews had the state apparatus, including the armed forces on their side, and being a boxer would have been very little help to an Arab citizen in most incidents of daily interethnic conflict.
After finishing middle school Hamze went with his older brother to work in construction in Tel Aviv, where he had the opportunity to join a leading boxing club and be trained by one of the best coaches in the country. In 1963, he joined the Beitar Netanya club, following his beloved coach, Yazi Ya’acbowitz, who also joined this club.
While writing in the late 1990s, Hamze expresses full awareness for the potential propagandist value that his athletic success gave Israel: “I understand today very well that those who were coaching me, or at least some of them, did not see any problem with me being a brilliant champion as long as they related me to Israel and it helped Israel for public relations purposes.” Again, this argument is uncommon among Arab athletes and former athletes, who usually prefer to present their success as a desirable model of integration.
One evening in March 1964, Hamze and his cousin Makram were involved in a fistfight between Arab and Jewish youngsters in a gas station. A Jewish man was severely injured and the two cousins were anxious that someone had been quick enough to write down their motorcycle number. Afraid of the police, they decided to escape to the Gaza Strip, which then was under Egyptian rule.
From this point on the plot becomes highly complicated and partly obscured due to the involvement of the Egyptian and Israeli security services. The Egyptian authorities sent them back to inside Israel, where they were immediately arrested. On April 17, they escaped from jail and crossed the border back to the Gaza Strip, where they were arrested again by the Egyptian forces who were suspicious about their escape story. After being convinced that the two were not Israeli agents, they were recruited to Egyptian intelligence as translators. Hamze was able to renew his boxing career, and his victories against Egyptian boxers made him very popular among the Palestinians in Gaza. During the 1967 war, Hamze was severely injured in his leg but was able to flee to Egypt. Later he moved to Lebanon, where he joined the Fatah forces. After being caught in 1971 on a guerilla mission, he was imprisoned in the Ramleh jail, from which he escaped to Lebanon in March 1974. In the late 1990s, Hamze lived in Jordan, and today he lives in Sweden.
Hamze Yunes might be the only sporting star who chose to cross the border and join the PLO. Moreover, while some Palestinian poets and intellectuals inside Israel express firm nationalist stands, it is very rare to find these voices among athletes. Sport has the power to tie the athletes to the state with bonds of commitments, hopes, and aspirations which minimize the chance that a revolutionary national leader will ever come from their ranks.
Nevertheless, young Hamze’s world view was probably not unique among other Arab boxers of his generation. What retroactively shaped his boxing narrative in such a unique way are his decades as a fighting member of the PLO, and his social and physical location during those years. Unlike Arab athletes of his generation, he is not concerned with the reactions of Jews in Israel to his opinions, and he long ago gave up on his integrative aspirations. He never had a chance to be a ‘Palestinian Muhammad Ali’ since his metamorphosis is a direct result of him being outside of the Israeli public sphere. Had he avoided the hasty decision to escape to Gaza in 1964, it is likely that he would have continued in the supervised and co-opted Israeli boxing framework and would have adopted its prevalent discourse.
Tamir Sorek studies the social, political, and cultural dynamics that shape ethnic and national identities, particularly in the context of Israel/Palestine. He is Professor of Sociology and Jewish Studies at the University of Florida.
1. The Military Government of Israel was a form of martial law imposed on a majority of the Palestinian-Arabs living in Israel from 1948 to 1966. Rights and protections afforded to these Palestinian-Arabs by virtue of their status as Israeli citizens were suspended during this period.
Minorities and the Kurdish Referendum
Kurds celebrating in Erbil, Iraq, on September 27, 2017 after the results of the independence referendum were announced. Credit: Ivor Prickett for The New York Times.
September 29, 2017
"We must write a new constitution for the region [Kurdistan Regional Government] that guarantees the rights of all components, and reassures them of their role in writing the constitution for an independent Kurdistan. We need a new national anthem, and changes to the Kurdistani flag so that it includes symbols of the components and is reflective of all." 1 -Masoud Barzani, August 2017
"In addition to the threat which this war has aimed at the existence and legitimate aspirations of our people, both Kurds and Assyrians, it has brought disaster and affliction upon all its victims, deprived the people of Kurdistan, particularly the Assyrians and the Kurds, of education and health [needs], and rendered tens of thousands of them refugees. All these [calamities] have been inflicted upon us only because we have claimed the basic and legitimate human and national rights, to which we, like any other people, are entitled." 2 -Mustafa Barzani, 1967
Faced with reluctance towards and outright rejection of the Kurdish referendum, Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), has turned to minorities for support. Under increased pressure and feeling more isolated, Kurdish politicians are resorting to a tactic they abandoned in 2003: negotiating with minorities. The similarities between the two quotations above, half a century apart, are revealing of an earlier period of political maneuvering and cross-communal partnership. Is it too late for negotiations? And have the historic links – cultural, economic, political – connecting the diverse ethno-religious communities in this region become too disrupted?
Though treated as welcome “guests” of the Kurdistan Regional Government, many of these “components,” to use Barzani’s term, are historic communities indigenous to the region. They include ethno-religious and linguistic groups, like the Assyrians, an Aramaic-speaking community belonging to a handful of Syriac Christian denominations; the Yezidis; and the Turkomen. Over the course of the twentieth-century and into the twenty-first, all of these communities have experienced dramatic shifts in their status. With the rise of nationalist and extremist ideologies, several events (Genocide of 1915, Simele Massacre 1933, Anfal Campaign 1988, and most recently ISIS) have precipitated significant declines in their numbers.
Kurdish policymakers and diplomats in the US have attempted to present the KRG as providing a safe haven for minorities that have escaped persecution in the rest of Iraq. This narrative, however, should be challenged on a few grounds.
The Kurds and Assyrians have deep cultural roots across the same region, and members of both communities began migrating to major urban centers in the second half of the twentieth-century in search of better educational and employment opportunities, mainly in the oil and transportation districts (Kirkuk, Baghdad and Basra). Following the civil war in 1961 between the Iraqi state and the Kurds, who were supported by various Assyrian groups and Iraqi leftists, many Assyrian villages were destroyed. The 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran put an end to Iranian support for the Iraqi opposition, and saw the onset of government campaigns against Kurdish and Assyrian villages along the Turkish and Iranian borders that persisted into the 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of Assyrian villagers were displaced, and their crops and cultural sites were destroyed. Most were forcibly removed from their ancestral lands and relocated in central and southern parts of the country. Iraq’s Ba‘ath regime subjected the Kurds and other groups inhabiting the territorial remit of today’s KRG to forced demographic movement – particularly in oil-rich Kirkuk, which was heavily populated by non-Arabs.
Though divided by periods of violence – for example, the Kurds were deployed by the Ottoman state in the 1915 Genocide against Assyrian and Armenian minorities, whose removal they ultimately benefited from economically – the Kurds and Assyrians have shared a similar fate, pursuing common political goals for most of the twentieth century. Both communities historically leaned left, joining parties espousing secular, nonsectarian principles. Kurds and Assyrians subscribed to leftist ideals that supported workers’ and farmers’ rights. Moreover, the pro-Iraqist political stance of leftist parties appealed to Assyrians and Kurds alike, who felt alienated from Arab nationalist and conservative ideologies.
Both economically and culturally marginalized, and under the influence of the powerful Barzani network, Assyrians joined the Kurdish uprising of 1961. Later, in the 1980s, Assyrians participated in the formal Iraqi opposition. In the early 1970s, 3,000 Assyrian men enlisted in the battalion of the Higher Committee for Christian Affairs in the north. In 1982 the Assyrian Democratic Movement – a political party founded by Assyrian students and youth – moved its bases to the north. Eventually, thousands joined its militia, which fought Saddam’s authoritarian regime alongside Kurdish and other Iraqi opposition groups. It is this momentous demonstration of Kurdish-Assyrian unity that Mustafa Barzani, leader of the KDP and father of Masoud Barzani, invokes in his 1967 statement.
Following the first Gulf War, the Kurdistan Regional Government was created in 1991, presiding over the safe haven and no-fly zone established by the United States and protected by coalition forces. Under this political configuration, the region’s identity was ethno-nationally Kurdish, but Kurdish leaders made room for Assyrians in the public sphere and civil society. However, disputes began to emerge when Assyrians, displaced by the Ba‘ath regime, sought to return and rebuild their villages now populated by Kurds. Lawsuits have been filed in Kurdish courts relating to 45 or so villages, with little or no effect, and new violations against other villages continue.
After Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘athist government fell in 2003, Assyrian groups active in the opposition turned south to negotiate with the new government in Baghdad. The KDP leadership felt betrayed, preferring to take the lead in discussions involving its “components.” Territories heavily populated by minority communities along the KRG borders, though officially under Mosul’s administration, came to be contested between the central and regional governments. Minorities preferred to administer their regions locally, as was allowed by the Iraqi constitution. Concerned that its territorial goals were being undermined, the KRG co-opted minorities by creating and funding civil society organizations and political groups on whose loyalty it could depend.3 More directly coercive methods followed, which included preventing ballot boxes from reaching contested territories and blocking the creation of independent local police forces. This last step would foreshadow the break in relations between the KRG and minority communities following the 2014 ISIS invasion. As both the Peshmerga, the KRG’s military arm, and Iraqi government forces withdrew from Nineveh and Sinjar, leaving Assyrians and Yezidis to face ISIS’ brutal onslaught alone, community leaders rallied to form independent local forces, as they had done just two decades before.
In a lecture delivered earlier this year, Dr. Muna Yaku, assistant professor of law at Salahaddin University-Erbil, suggested that for minorities to feel fully engaged with the referendum they must have real dialogue with Kurds on equal terms, instead of being treated as guests. She highlighted KRG violations against minority communities ranging from political manipulation of quota seats, the continuation of forced demographic change, and the exclusion or misrepresentation of minorities within educational curricula.4 Dr. Yaku was chosen to represent Christians in a committee formed to amend the KRG constitution, but eventually she withdrew in protest at violations of minority
rights.5 Similarly, Dohuk native Ashur Sargon Eskrya, President of the Assyrian Aid Society-Iraq, recalling atrocities experienced by minorities, insisted: “When our Assyrian Christian people are facing challenges that affect their national existence on their historic lands…the principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples must be adopted in a manner that preserves for our people the right to self-determination and the preservation of their lands and cultural and social heritage, as well as all peoples of the world.”6
A day before the referendum, the high committee for KRG’s referendum issued a declaration guaranteeing the rights of minorities.7 Many community leaders have since criticized that statement, calling it unbinding and shortsighted.8 Whether the referendum drives the KRG to independence or stifles it in the face of mounting pressure, the discussion that led up to it has highlighted the need to revive real and transparent dialogue between the Kurdish leadership and minority leaders, as well as between civil society groups and intellectuals on both sides. Relations between the two will take time to normalize, but engaging with politically independent, local representatives of minorities is a step in the right direction. It is important to remember that only a few decades ago, the Kurds themselves insisted on their community’s rights to full political participation.
Dr. Alda Benjamen specializes in the history of the modern Middle East; in particular she focuses on twentieth-century intellectual, cultural and social history of Iraq and Syria, Middle Eastern minorities and their transnational networks, and women and gender issues. As a postdoctoral Researcher at the Penn Cultural Heritage Center, University of Pennsylvania Museum, she examines cultural heritage in times of conflict, focusing on intangible heritage within agricultural domains.
2. Department of State, Division of Language Services (Translation), LS No. 10056, T-58, Arabic, April 22, 1969, “The Honorable William Rogers, Secretary of State of the United States of America,” 1.
3. Alda Benjamen, “Assyrians in Iraq’s Nineveh Plains: Grassroot organizations and Inter-Communal Conflict.” The American Academic Research Institute in Iraq no. 6-1 (Spring 2011): 13-20.
4. “A lecture by Dr. Muna Yaku on the future prospects for the region and the view of our peope,” Facebook video, 18:52, posted by “Radio Ashur,” February 12, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/radioashur/videos/1174189616013352/?hc_ref=ARS2...
6. Ashur Sargon Eskrya statement was issued on the on the tenth anniversary of the UNDRIP, September 13, 2017, on his facebook page.
7. http://www.presidency.krd/arabic/articledisplay.aspx?id=kpY+pCLPyQY=# ; http://www.ankawa.com/forum/index.php?topic=854423.0
8. http://www.ankawa.com/forum/index.php?topic=854474.0 ; http://www.ankawa.com/forum/index.php?topic=854522.0
The Solar Eclipse in Islamic Tradition
August 21, 2017
"Astrology informed a great deal of medieval Islamic art. It references the solar calendar, which in any preindustrial society, is extremely important—it tells you when to plant, when to go to war, when to lay foundations for buildings. Any court had its astrological advisors, who had their own fans and enemies." -Persis Berlekamp, Associate Professor of Art History
"In the Islamic tradition, a solar eclipse is both ordinary and extraordinary. It is extraordinary in the sense that it disrupts our everyday expectation of night and day and their regularity; in this sense, it is another sign of God's power. It is ordinary in the sense that it is part of a divine plan and has no significance beyond its attestation of divine omnipotence." -Alireza Doostdar, Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies and the Anthropology of Religion
More: "Eclipse reflects sun's historic power" by Louise Lerner, UChicago News Office.
Fighting Nazis – Middle Eastern and Islamic Style!
Lime Balla, an Albanian Muslim and one of the Righteous Among the Nations honored by Yad Vashem, Israel's official memorial to the victims of the Holocaust.
August 14, 2017
We were all troubled, like many Americans and concerned citizens across the globe, by the images we saw coming from Charlottesville, VA. In CMES, we teach classes on the modern Middle East, and how WWII profoundly affected the region, whose countries became actual battlefields (especially in North Africa) and whose elites were influenced by the competing ideologies of democracy, social democracy, socialism, communism, fascism and Nazism.
Much has been written on Middle Eastern and Muslim leaders who sought collaboration with the Axis powers, partly mesmerized by Germany's speedy economic and military recovery under Hitler and partly believing that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," namely that collaboration of Arabs and Muslims with the Germans and the Italians would help Arabs and Muslims fight British and French colonialism and imperialism.
However, in recent years, a new wave of scholars has underscored the significance of groups who resisted fascism and Nazism in the Middle East. Who were these groups? Some were democrats and liberals who feared the Nazis' disregard for human life and human rights. Since part of the Middle Eastern elites were educated in France, many intellectuals bemoaned its fall, the humane cultures it represented, and the bleak future that anticipated Europe after its occupation by Germany. Arab intellectuals also reminded readers that German anti-Semitism was directed against Arabs as well. It continued a long tradition where Arab writers took pride in their Semitic origins and Semitic contribution to world civilization. Egyptian writers in particular, terrified by the conquest of Ethiopia by Fascist Italy, feared that they were next in line. The 1930s and 1940s marked the rise of the Arab left and many an Arab socialist and communist condemned the German regime, especially after the entry of the USSR to the war. There was also a political camp that still supported collaboration with the French and British and many other Arab writers who argued that it would be a fatal mistake to replace the older colonialism with the much more horrid form of German and Italian colonization.
Finally, Muslim scholars, Sunni and Shi'i alike, argued that Fascism and Nazism were inherently contradictory to Islam. These Western regimes and ideologies, with their deifying the state, with the preference their leaders and ideologues gave to ethnicity and purity of blood over ethics, with their admiration of power, and with their conquest of Muslim subjects in the name of racial superiority, contradicted the Islamic religion whose foundations centered on the unity of God, underlined the preference of faith over ethnicity, and celebrated mercy and compassion. Scholars have likewise documented the many Muslims, in North Africa, Albania, Turkey, and Iraq, as well as the foreign Egyptian, Palestinian, Iranian and Turkish diplomats and subjects residing in Europe, who provided help to Jews fleeing death. Such behavior gives us much hope in this day and age.
Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History
Director, Center for Middle Eastern Studies
For Further Reading
On Palestinian views, and on the Palestinian leftist Najati Sidqi, his involvement in the Spanish Civil War and anti-Fascist activities:
- "Did the Muslim World Really Fall for Hitler" by John Broich [Slate]
- "The Enigmatic Jerusalem Bolshevik: The Memoirs of Najati Siqi" by Salim Tamari [Institute for Palestine Studies]
- "Palestinians and the Syrian Revolution: Lessons from the fight against fascism" by Talal Alyan [+972]
Israel Gershoni and James Jankowsky on Egypt:
- "Narratives of Modern Egyptian History" Introduction from Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s
Diplomats and Muslim subjects in Europe who assisted Jews:
- "Righteous Among the Nations: Muslims Who Saved Jews from the Holocaust" by Tim Townsend [Huffington Post]
- "The 'Other' Righteous Gentiles: Muslims" by Richard Silverstein [Tikun Olam]
- "The 'Iranian Schindler' who saved Jews from the Nazis" by Brian Wheeler [BBC News]
- "Remembering the Muslim 'Schindlers' Who Saved Jews From the Nazis" by Avital Chizhik-Goldschmidt [Haaretz]
- "Sardari, the Iranian Muslim Who Saved Jews from the Holocaust" by Shima Shahrabi [IranWire]
- "True courage of one who had to act" [The Telegraph]
- Selahattin Ülkümen (1914 - 2003) one of the Righteous Among the Nations, Yad Vashem
- "Yad Vashem Names Egyptian First Arab Righteous Among the Nations" by Ofer Aderet [Haaretz]
Albanians who saved Jews in Europe:
- "Besa: A Code of Honor - Muslim Albanians Who Rescued Jews During the Holocaust" [Yad Vashem]
- "Destan and Lime Balla" [Yad Vashem]
Armenians who saved Jews:
- "Armenian Righteous Among the Nations" [Yad Vashem]
- List of Armenian Righteous Among the Nations honored by Yad Vashem as of January 1, 2017
On the Farhud:
The following books provide information about resistance to Fascism and Nazism across North Africa and the Middle East
- Arab World: Arab Responses to Fascism and Nazism: Attraction and Repulsion edited by Israel Gershoni, University of Texas Press, 2014
- North Africa: Among the Righteous: Lost Stories from the Holocaust's Long Reach into Arab Lands by Robert Satloff, PublicAffairs, 2007
- Palestine: Memoirs of Najati Sidqi (1905-1979) introduced and compiled by Hanna Abu Hanna, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001
- Egypt: Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s by Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Stanford University Press, 2009
- Syria: Nazism in Syria and Lebanon: The Ambivalence of the German Option, 1933-1945 by Götz Nordbruch, Routledge, 2009
- Turkey: Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey’s Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933–1945 by Stanford J. Shaw, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993